The principal contributions of this study are four-fold. First, we propose and illustrate a unifying meta-model architecture for fusing information in sensor-based decision support systems capable of delivering to the user strong inference results in support of tactical decision-making. Second, we demonstrate the feasibility of a completely automated system performing effective estimation of force operational states based on sensor data alone using a new web-based interactive tactical simulation. Third, we show that this architecture can readily accommodate several major network inference methods that are designed to handle battlespace uncertainty. And lastly, we discuss how this approach can be used to directly assess the information advantage of US Forces relative to opposing force intelligence gathering capabilities and the implications of doing so on developing strategic deception operations.
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Introduction
The principal contributions of this study are four-fold. First, we propose and illustrate a unifying meta-model architecture for fusing information in sensor-based decision support systems capable of delivering to the user strong inference results in support of tactical decision-making. Second, we demonstrate the feasibility of a completely automated system performing effective estimation of force operational states based on sensor data alone using a new web-based interactive tactical simulation. Third, we show that this architecture can readily accommodate several major network inference methods that are designed to handle battlespace uncertainty. And lastly, we discuss how this approach can be used to directly assess the information advantage of US Forces relative to opposing force intelligence gathering capabilities and the implications of doing so on developing strategic deception operations..
Battlefield sensing technologies and techniques have become increasingly important
in the transformed Army of the twenty-first century. Commanders seek to leverage information to gain unsurpassed battlefield dominance while at the same time reducing overall operational risk to soldiers in a variety of deployment scenarios [1, 2]. Our study responds directly to these priorities.
The underlying purpose here should be to enhance a commander's ability to perform effective inference concerning opposing force operational states because doing so leads to a natural notion of information advantage: friendly forces know more about what opposing forces are actually doing a significant period of time before the opposing force knows what friendly forces are doing. A simply constructed yet logically robust framework for performing this inference needs to avoid undue complexity, both in terms of logical structure (for implementation's sake) and raw information requirements (to avoid information overload). For sensor-based systems in particular, information overload becomes a concern if the end user is no longer able to productively use the quantity of information within the time scale available [15] .
While new approaches to sensor data handling have been proposed to satisfy some of the performance demands of decision support systems [3, 4] , tacit to such approaches is a design assumption that the quality of the information in such systems increases as the data 1 sample size generated by battlefield sensors increases in both quantity and dimensional representation. This assumption is based on the concept of enumerative logic, which accepts that evidence in support of a specific inference is accumulated over time and more evidence accumulated over time enhances the strength of this information with respect to this inference [6] . Exclusively adopting this philosophy naturally leads engineers to design and field increasingly complex battlefield networks capable of gathering, storing, and processing this information much faster than it can be understood and exploited by human decision makers [14] .
To avoid information overload one could adopt a philosophy consistent with economic theory. This viewpoint contends that decision relevant information that does not alter a pre-existing decision is not information; it is only serves to confirm the decision that has been made [6] . We discourage such a parochial philosophy in a tactical setting because it fails to recognize the contribution that different forms of information make to a military decision-making. For example, there is tangible military value in conflicting, contradictory, and confirmatory information processed in support of verifying military targeting. These types of information typically arise as ancillary evidence, that is, evidence concerning evidence that goes to subjective concerns of credibility and believability on the part of users.
To put it another way, information of this nature, while not information in the technical economic sense described above, nevertheless serves the vital military purpose of validating operational decisions. This kind of information strengthens rather than diminishing the inferential force of existing evidence. On a practical level, it strengthens the resolve behind command decisions.
In contrast to enumerative logic, eliminative logic provides a philosophical basis for supporting inference by seeking contradictory evidence that can negate alternative explanations. It is this logic that underscores the well-known practice of disproving conjectures by identifying counter-examples. Taken at its extreme, eliminative logic supports a conjecture that when all other possibilities have been eliminated, the remaining possibility condition is true. The culling nature of this philosophy has real potential to limit the occurrence of information overload.
It should be possible to combine both forms of logic: enumerative and eliminative, within the logical design of a fusion approach, much in the same way that primal-dual approaches are used in mathematical programming [9] and game theory, playing against each other until some predetermined condition is satisfied. This strategy could exploit some portion of the in-flow buildup of real time opportunistic information yet limit the extent of overload by simultaneously imposing criteria that could appropriately cull the number of possible inference estimates the evidence gathered might reasonably support.
In this paper, we define and test a logical framework within which such a fusion approach could succeed. Figure 1 illustrates the placement of this study within a spectrum of possible systems modeling approaches [35] . While the meta-model architecture stands alone as a mechanism for illuminating a new perspective on intelligent systems design, it also advocates a general decision support tool that could be integrated in some fashion into a common operating picture (COP) for developing situational awareness of enemy operational state. Therefore, the study resides approximately midway between routine decision support and representing possible system design and changes in Figure 1 .
This framework, called a meta-model architecture, incorporates the structural concept of a sensor network as an information manufacturing system [10] focused on estimating enemy intent through the surrogate of identifying the current enemy operational state. Doing so necessitates that we decompose and identify the layers of inference abstraction required to make such an identification, which we do in Section 2. This perspective sets apart our metamodel from other data fusion approaches such as that developed by the Data Fusion Subpanel of the Technology Panel for C3 (command, control, communications) of the Joint Directors of Laboratories (JDL) [16] .
In Section 3, we formally introduce a meta-model architecture in the spirit of Wand and Weber [5] that simplifies the representation of information flowing in a sensor-based decision support system. Recognizing that such a framework must naturally accommodate the inherent uncertainty present in battlefield information, we demonstrate in Section 4 the meta-model's ability to accept three major stochastic network inference models: Bayesian
Belief Network [19] , Fuzzy Logic [20] , and Probabilistic Modal Logic [21] .
To illustrate the feasibility of this approach, we use results of recent computational experiment in which a new interactive web-based simulation identified a force's operational state by detecting the physical characteristics of force behavior. Following this, in Section 5
we discuss how this approach leads directly to a natural way of determining the information advantage of US Forces relative to opposing force capabilities, concluding with comments in Section 6 pertaining to continued research in this area. Figure 1 . Placement of this study amidst a spectrum of systems modeling approaches.
Inference Structure
The layers of inference that must be negotiated in order to estimate operational intent increase as one examines the structure of battlefield information in finer granularity. Here, we limit our excursion in this regard to the simplest abstraction sufficient to illustrate both our motivation for and the challenges associated with identifying a force's operational state as a surrogate for intent. Figure 2 illustrates the inference structure underlying our metamodel approach. In the illustration, each of the vertical lines dividing the text boxes should be interpreted in the classic sense of "given" put forth in conditional logic.
This structure posits that intent provides the impetus for deciding a force's operational state. However, since intent is a pure intellectual construct it is not explicitly evident in the physical world. It must be communicated or transformed into action in order to become evident. In doing so, some elements of intent are lost when married to a force's At the key descriptor level, the inference layers bifurcate into two major paths defined by the sensor network purpose. Presumably, targeting networks would require threshold levels for individual elements of each key descriptor set to be met as conditions of acceptance. The composite perspective of each set then provides a targeting profile that supports engagement criteria, target identification, ordinance requirements, and supplemental actions required. On the other hand, and consistent with the focus of this paper, the key descriptor levels also support situational battlespace awareness. Along this path, such levels facilitate prediction of an enemy operational state which logically acts as a surrogate for creating estimates of enemy intent as well.
Even in this much simplified inference pathway from true intent to estimated intent, one gains a sense of the many layers of inference abstraction being negotiated in the process of using sensor data to produce estimates. The uncertainty introduced during each of the various transformations affecting an inferential transition between layers compounds the challenge. Hence, one can certainly understand the belief that 'more must be better,' an axiom of enumerative logic that leads to extensive information requirements for battlefield sensor networks.
By contrast, in the meta-model construction that follows, we aimed to minimize information requirements. Instead, we built an architecture predicated on the concept of gathering supporting data in an enumerative fashion and exploiting eliminative evidence in order to winnow the possible set of operational states. We relegate to the three probabilistic network learning models discussed in section 4 the task of dealing effectively with the underlying uncertainty present in such an approach.
Information Meta-model Architecture
In order to specify the information that a sensor-based system should acquire, it is necessary to first define and organize battlefield information in consideration of what is to be done with the information once it is obtained. Here, we introduce a set of ontological constructs and rules for defining and deriving battlefield information in support of an information fusion process. We use the term 'ontology' in the sense defined by Poli [17] By assuming that intent provides a complete and sufficient motivation for force action in a battlespace environment, we impose the condition that a body of force acts as a (possibly loosely) coordinated organization. The totality of actions motivated by force intent define an operational state. An operational state ultimately represents evidence supporting an underlying operational intent while intermingled with intentioned deception and operational errors. Since battlefield sensors cannot discriminate between these elements, it seems reasonable to expect the structure of any battlefield information framework to somehow process all three in such a way that the actual operational state eventually becomes predominant. We assume that deception and operational errors represent a minority propotion of the total evidence present on the battlefield based on the principles of warfare discussed in FM 3-0. FM 3-0 also supports our assumption that, excepting minor variations in theme, the major number of independent (possibly unique) operational states a particular force is able to assume in a known battlespace is finite.
Model structure
The meta-model, M, we propose is concisely defined by a 5-tuple M= (S, V, K, O, E) that captures the necessary elements of the battlespace we need to identify operational state. Figure 3 shows a graphical illustration of the entity arrangement that follows. In the ontological framework proposed by Wand and Weber [5] , M corresponds to a modeling grammar. In the following paragraphs, we define each member of this tuple using standard notation suggested by Wymore [22] . The underlying inference logic connecting each of the elements of information within this structure is Pascalian, meaning that support for or against a particular hypothesis concerning activity is accumulated over time. Specific implementations of this meta-model will most likely restrict p to a certain subset of R, as is the case with Kolmogorov probability measures [15] that limit the range of probability to 0 to 1. A straightforward modification of either estimation functions or key descriptor mappings can easily incorporate time effects such as the value of tactical information [25] , or on the timeliness of data within the network flow [23] , if such factors were of direct interest.
The following examples illustrate how one employs this architecture to capture various information elements necessary to support effective inference concerning force operational state. 
Computational Experiments
As stated earlier in the paper, our interest in computational testing is two-fold: to examine how easily the major network inference models can exploit the meta-model framework, and
to assess the quality of each of their resulting inferences concerning a force's actual operational state in the face of inherent uncertainty.
We designed a web-based computational experiment [11] involving three major network inference models. The experiment featured an interactive Java-based simulation of an unopposed force executing one of thirty-four possible missions. These missions, authored by individual human interaction with the simulation, reflected possible adaptations of one of five force operational states -Sustainment, Decisive Attack, Shaping Attack, Decisive
Defense, and Shaping Defense [13] . Within this test environment, each participant had the ability to structure their force layout and movement in any way they desired so long as they arrayed these activities to achieve the assigned mission.
Once an operation was executed, a set of simulated sensors gathered evidence of lowlevel activity for several hundred enemy agents while continually updating a set of sixteen key descriptors. We forged these key descriptors during pre-experiment tuning by applying expert tactical knowledge to a set of test missions. For each mission, the three simultaneous implementations of the meta-model used these key descriptors to identify the actual enemy operational state. The following paragraphs briefly describe each implementation. While a full discussion and design specification for each of the network learning models is beyond the scope of this paper, it is available in [11] and can be supplied upon request of the authors.
The first network learning model implementation of the meta-model featured a
Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) design. This implementation designates each of the five possible operational states as one of five hypotheses. Each hypothesis is assigned a preset prior probability based on the enemy's last known operational state, the initial prior being the usual naïve neutral. The design establishes conditional probabilities for each operational state-key descriptor pair reflecting the likelihood of each state given the presence of the key descriptor. Figure 8 illustrates a scaled-down, three hypotheses version of this design.
During simulation, the BBN implementation executes the following algorithm. As the enemy carries out his mission, the fusion coordinator updates key descriptor values based on sensor detection of enemy agents. The fusion coordinator then computes a posterior probability by applying standard Bayesian updating methods [8] to the previously described BBN. Once the fusion coordinator obtains a certain threshold in posterior values (i.e. one operational state hypothesis dominates the others), a new set of priors is loaded and the algorithm repeated.
The second implementation featured a Probabilistic Modal Logic (PML) design largely championed by Halpern [7] . This design conceptualizes operational states as possible worlds -one world for each of the five possible operational states introduced previously.
The PML relationship function between the possible worlds reflects the likelihood that, given the enemy's perceived operational state, the enemy is actually in another alternate operational state. We created these relationship functions based on the similarities of the five operational states to one another in both time and space dimensions. For each world, we designated a compact rule set that uses the support for specific key descriptors to reason about the enemy's next state.
The PML fusion algorithm functions similarly to the BBN algorithm. The fusion coordinator first establishes a perceived operational enemy state as the current world. The algorithm then updates key descriptor values based on simulation events, and uses these values to trigger the specific rule sets in the current world and all adjoining possible worlds.
The algorithm then uses combined reasoning across all worlds to arrive at truth-values for the enemy's next state. Once one particular next state probability dominates, the fusion coordinator establishes a new current world and repeats the algorithm.
The third implementation used a Fuzzy Logic approach [20] . 
Computational Results
As previously mentioned, we used a portion of our original data to tune each meta- to position their forces and their movement in any way desired, no matter how unorthodox their choice, as long as it was consistent with achieving the mission. Our desire was to not constrain the boundaries of the operational state space any more than absolutely necessary so that we adequately stressed the meta-model framework. 
Estimating Operational State
During each simulation, nine performance measures were initially developed to determine the effectiveness of each implementation [11] with respect to various concerns. Of the nine used, two measures are significant for our purposes herein -Performance Measure 4 (PM4) and Performance Measure 6 (PM6). PM4 was a modification of the tuning criteria, measuring how far out of first place (in a ranking of most likely states) the actual operational state is at simulation termination (less is better). PM6 measured the fraction of time the implementation's estimated state did not match the enemy's actual state during the entire simulation run (less is better).
A summary of the simulation results are depicted in Tables 1 and 2 . Examining PM4 (Table 1) , we see all three implementations successfully predicted the actual enemy operational state at termination in thirty-one of thirty-four trials (97% accuracy). Of the three mistaken estimates, all three coordinators ranked the actual operational state second at simulation termination on missions #9026 and #0810, while the Fuzzy coordinator alone correctly identified decisive attack on mission #5412.
The accuracy of PM4 validates our principal research objective, to wit: the metamodel's ability to fuse low-level sensor information into a meaningful and accurate result when our interest is a static prediction of operational state. In this capacity all three of the network inference methods were able to ultimately resolve operational uncertainty by sensing enemy activity alone. Additionally, the consistency in PM4 performance across all three implementations suggests that a strategy of adopting a unifying and implementationindependent quality in the meta-model approach to sensor fusion makes sense. Furthermore, it provides a logical architecture for developing pure information models of military operations. This capability is essential for an accurate understanding of how future forces might leverage information to compensate for reductions in more traditional forceeffectiveness dimensions such as pure power and lethality afforded by heavily armored and fitted force.
PM6 provides more information on how the implementations performed throughout the simulation. Here, implementation performance varied greatly among the inference models. and 72% of the simulation time, respectively, in an incorrect estimation state.
To assess whether the observed differences in PM6 were statistically significant, we turned to a paired testing because the results are linked via individual authors. The assumption of normality on the distribution of computed differences required by both the Student's t-Test and Tukey-Kramer Highest Significant Difference (HSD) was unsupported by the data when examined with both Shapiro-Wilks ( Figure 10 ) and Ryan-Joiner (Figure 11) goodness-of-fit tests. Table 3 . Wilcoxon signed-rank test for differences in median performance on PM6.
We instead used the more robust nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test [30] which does not require the normality assumption. The results in Table 3 In terms of the observable differences on PM6, we believe that culpability for this behavior is attributable to three principle causes. First, while the static criteria of end-state estimation imbedded in the tuning phase implicitly drives each coordinator to achieve a successful prediction of operational state as soon as possible via a minimization, it is inadequate to the task of maintaining a lock onto such a prediction enroute to this state. The tuning phase for this experimentation adhered to currently accepted conventions [31] by using 25 missions (5 per operational state) to tune the parameters of each coordinator until each of the coordinators successfully estimated the actual operational state at simulation termination. These parameters included the conditional probability values in the Bayesian coordinator, the state transition probabilities in the PML coordinator, and the fuzzy variable membership functions in the Fuzzy coordinator. We then discarded the 25 missions comprising this training set, and used 34 new user-generated missions to assess our metamodel architecture. We made no attempt to measure or control coordinator behavior prior to termination because the issue at-hand concerned assessing the meta-model's capability of accommodating each of the coordinators. In retrospect, this static tuning limits our ability to make maximum use of this architecture. Investigation into appropriate alternative tuning methods that focus on improving inference model performance during the simulation's state transition stages is on-going.
Secondly, the inherent difference in the manner in which each coordinator represents uncertainty induces a natural variability in their comparative performance. The Bayesian coordinator uses a pure mathematical definition of probability as a measure of uncertainty [25] . In the PML coordinator, the rapid growth in the key descriptor state space forced us to abandon probability-based transitions in the face of less mathematical, albeit time proven, certainty factors advocated in the literature [7] . The Fuzzy model uses yet another definition of uncertainty altogether [32] . These differences reflect accepted applications of these frameworks in uncertainty modeling [28] . However, there is an emerging interest [29] in examining the interfaces between phenomena, uncertainty calculi and observers to move 
Discussion
Existing Our choice to develop this meta-model architecture with a focus on a single force's behavior increases its applicability for modeling purposes. By creating a modular unit that can be combined with other meta-models, the architecture can be used in pure informationbased force-on-force simulations. Moreover, by focusing one meta-model on opposing force operations and a separate one on friendly force operations, a practical operational measure for assessing information advantage results. In the following discussion, we assume that we have applied an alternative tuning method for the parameters of the network learning model as described earlier.
Information Advantage
Using the meta-model architecture, suppose that we select a particular network inference method, say BBN, for its ability to out-perform the others by having a higher rate of accurately estimating and locking onto the actual operational state of a force in the context of the force's specific battlespace presence in a minimal amount of time. Herein we assumed a conventional force presence in which five force operations defined the suite of possible operational states. Figure 12 . Asymmetric intelligence gathering capabilities.
To assess the overall force capability in this regard, one could apply an aggregate measure across all possible pairs of operational states. However, because this would tend to hide important operational weaknesses, a better approach would be to simply profile the comparison in using a tornado graph or similar display, hypothetically shown in Figure 13 . This approach would highlight operational strong and weak points in this regard, illuminate where intelligence capabilities require augmentation, and suggest how one might consider cross-leveling capability to achieve a more globally strategic information advantage for the force.
For the pairwise comparisons of hypothetical friendly operational states (OF*) to opposing force operational states (OO*) shown in Figure 13 , we would conclude that the opposing force has a complete information advantage when it is conducting OO3 since the friendly forces at best achieve parity when choosing to conduct OF1 in response. Friendly forces have a strong information advantage against OO2 except for the case when it is paired with OF1. It is attractive to further consider the opportunity to rank order the effectiveness of proposed changes in capability via a marginal returns assessment, using either improvements in sensor capability:
. Both quantities are obtainable if one restricts the support for key descriptors to behave monotonically or quasimonotonically. If the underpinning logic is purely enumerative, this is the case; more is better, or at least more is not worse with respect to levels of support for key descriptors.
However, as one incorporates eliminative logic into the structure, the monotonicity of kd behavior would depend upon the estimation function as well. And, while imposing diminishing marginal returns to information gained through the sensor-based system [27] , the assessment results in this regard would help systems designers prioritize investment decisions under the usual 'bang-for-the-buck' criteria.
Since an operational state is solely a function of a core minimal set of key descriptors that allows an observing system to distinguish between states, the meta-model architecture provides specific guidance as to how to establish and maintain information advantage: 
Conclusion
Possessing an accurate estimate of an opposing force's actual operational state provides friendly commanders an ability to shape friendly battlefield activities to disrupt this operational state and hence alter enemy-generated activities as a consequence.
The meta-model architecture we introduce in this study provides a framework within which one can accurately estimate an opposing force's actual operational state in concert with any one of a number of automated network learning systems. This architecture also provides a methodology for determining the degree of information asymmetry between pairs of competing operational states, leading to a suggested methodology for structuring efficient strategic deception operations. Commanders understanding that this information asymmetry is directly linked to evidential support for key descriptors could shape battlefield activities to disrupt the opposing force's operational state. The point we are making here is subtle. We are advocating shifting the battlespace focus from responding to and interdicting enemy activities to estimating and disrupting enemy operational states, which naturally aligns mission focus at the same conceptual level of abstraction as command intent and thereby directly supports effects-based operations.
A force's operational state can be significantly influenced by a host of complicating factors not considered in this study, such as training, motivation, capability, environmental conditions, and of course its adversary's operational state. Some of these complicating factors, in particular those that have elements that are directly observable by sensor systems, can be accommodated in the meta-model in a straightforward manner by expanding the set of key descriptors accordingly. Others require significant modifications to the meta-model. As an example, for this architecture we implicitly assume that a force's operational state is independent of that chosen by its adversary since there are no looping constructs in the inference chain shown in Figure 1 . However, if evolving force interaction is of interest in further work, then this assumption should be avoided so that first and possibly second order feedback behavior is considered in the inference chain as well. One could furthermore incorporate expert opinion into the architecture by applying selective convex weighting coefficients to the individual operational states within the model's estimation functions.
Such a preferential weighting could also be applied to the estimation functions themselves using methods specifically designed to aggregate subjective distributions under uncertainty [33] .
Fusion systems using the meta-model architecture can define a discrete and minimum set of battlefield sensors and key descriptors that completely differentiate all possible opposing force operational states. To accomplish this, one could adopt a two-stage optimal matching of available sensors to key descriptors and a matching of key descriptors to operational states in order to reduce the sets of key descriptors used in a meta-model to their minimum size. Possible optimality objectives under such an approach could include minimizing total sensor quantity, minimizing operational state uncertainty, maximizing sensor redundancy, or minimizing ontological overlap [34] . This final objective is the logical analog to maximizing mutual exclusivity between key descriptor sets. One could also consider applying a principle of diminishing marginal returns under constrained time-space considerations in order to identify efficient allocation of sensors [27] .
Force designers could easily make use of this information to establish guidelines for sensor survivability, sensor scheduling, and sensor communication networks [26] . Since the meta-model framework is inclusive of any type of sensor including human, mixed-mode and composite suite design is also afforded by the results. Since the meta-model, culling as it does from deployed systems those that have very low marginal contributions to inference, can yield information about how much each sensor contributes to the operational state estimation process, one might use the meta-model architecture as a tool for evaluating an existing sensor organization.
Finally, we note that successfully using this architecture for fusing battlefield information depends on carefully constructing definitions for key descriptors with the goal of capturing a core set of differentiating elements. While our characterization of key descriptors based on FM 3.0 appears sufficient for this study, we suspect that more sophisticated definitions for these descriptors could improve the estimations provided by the inference models, especially for those operational states having less well-defined space and time 
